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Posas v. Horton, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 12 (April 15, 2010)1
 
 
TORT LAW – SUDDEN-EMERGENCY JURY INSTRUCTION 
 
 Appeal from a district court judgment entering a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, 




 The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that because 
Respondent was negligent and did not exercise reasonable care, the district court abused its 
discretion by giving sudden-emergency jury instruction that prejudiced the appellant. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Appellant Emilia Posas was driving in her vehicle when a jaywalking pedestrian pushing 
a stroller crossed the street in front of her vehicle.  When Posas abruptly stopped her vehicle in 
order to avoid hitting the pedestrian, Respondent Nicole Horton subsequently hit the rear of 
Posas’s vehicle with the front-end of her vehicle.  Although Horton was following Posas’s 
vehicle by three to four feet, she did not notice the pedestrian cross the street directly in front of 
Posas’ vehicle before the accident.  Also, Horton admitted that she had made a mistake by 
following Posas’ vehicle too closely. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Posas brought a personal injury action against Horton, and the district court supplied the 
jury with a sudden-emergency instruction.2
 
  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Horton and 




The sudden-emergency doctrine is not applicable 
The Court considered the applicability of the sudden-emergency doctrine to this case, and 
found that sudden-emergency jury instruction is only appropriate when the party requesting the 
instruction demonstrates that:  (1) unexpected conditions were present through no negligence of 
the requesting party; and (2) the requesting party exercised reasonable care. 
In this case, Horton maintained that she was not at fault because the pedestrian created a 
sudden emergency, she did not cause the pedestrian to cross the street, and she acted as a 
reasonable prudent person by abruptly stopping her vehicle.  However, the Court reasoned that 
because Horton was following Posas’ vehicle too closely, Horton did not meet the second 
element of the sudden-emergency doctrine.  The Court held that Horton’s negligence, as opposed 
to the jaywalking pedestrian, placed her in a position of peril.. 
                                                 
1 By Amy C. Ma. 
2 “The sudden-emergency instruction stated:  A person confronted with a sudden emergency which he does not 
create, who acts according to his best judgment or, because of insufficient time to form a judgment fails to act in the 
most judicious manner, is not guilty of negligence if he exercises the care of a reasonably prudent person in like 
circumstances.”  Posas v. Horton, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 12, 2-3 n.1 (Apr. 15, 2010). 
 
  
Adoption of Templeton Analysis 
 The Court noted that although Nevada has utilized the sudden-emergency jury 
instruction, the law is unclear when it is appropriately given.  .  In turn, the Court adopted the 
analysis found in Templeton v. Smith, where a defendant collided with the vehicle in front of her 
because the defendant was looking in her rearview mirror.3  The trial court gave the jury sudden-
emergency instructions, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.4  However, the 
appellate court reversed the judgment and reasoned that when a person engages in certain 
activities, he must be prepared to confront emergencies that are likely to arise while engaging in 
the activity.5  In turn, a driver must be able to anticipate the occurrence of sudden obstacles and 
sudden stops.6  Consequently, the occurrence of these anticipated events do not constitute an 
actual emergency.7
  
  Finally, the Court found that the emergency must affect the actor, and the 
sudden-emergency doctrine does not apply to a person who has created or caused the emergency 
to occur. 
 The sudden-emergency jury instruction only applies when a party acted due to a valid 
emergency, did not create the emergency, and exercised reasonable care.  If a party fails to 
exercise reasonable care, then the use of a sudden-emergency jury instruction is prejudicial.   
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
3 Templeton v. Smith, 744 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
